Russo-Ukrainian war (2022–present) order of battle

Russo-Ukrainian war (2022–present) order of battle

This is the order of battle for the Russo-Ukrainian war (2022–present). It should not be considered complete, up-to-date, nor fully accurate, being based on open-source press reporting.

An updated order of battle estimate for 23 April 2023, by the Institute for the Study of War is accessible at:

Another ISW-relevant publication, published in October 2023:

• Russian Regular Ground Forces Order of Battle: Russian Military 101

Russian forces in 2022

Administrative chain of command

Commanders of the various MOD armed services and branches do not have operational control over the forces. They are responsible for force development and generation. The Chiefs of the ground forces, aerospace forces, navy, strategic missile forces, and airborne forces also hold the appointments of Deputy Ministers of Defence, junior to the Chief of the General Staff, who is the First Deputy Minister of Defence.

The General Staff commands and controls forces through the National Defence Management Centre (NDMC). Operational control of the forces was carried out by the five Operational-Strategic Commands—the Western, Southern, Central, and Eastern Military Districts and the OSK Northern Fleet, which is their equal. The Western and Southern Military Districts share borders with Ukraine and are directly involved in command and control of operations.

Pre-2022 Russian military doctrine had specified that on the outbreak of war, armed forces from non-MOD services (like Rosgvardiya) would be placed under the General Staff.

Initial force groupings

Ukrainian military commentator Yuri Butusov listed the following initial March 2022 deployment of Russian/allied forces:

<table><thead><tr><th>Grouping</th><th>Role</th><th>Located around</th><th>Forces from</th><th>Estimated strength</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Southwestern Belarus</td><td>blocking contingent against Ukrainian forces in Western Ukraine</td><td>Brest, Luninyets, Baranavichy, Asipovichy and Minsk</td><td></td><td>6–7 Battalion tactical group (BTGs)</td></tr><tr><td>Southeastern Belarus</td><td>Kyiv offensive direction</td><td>Vepri, Elsin, Brahin, Khainini, Rechytsa and Mazyr</td><td>5th, 35th and 36th Combined Arms Armies (CAA)</td><td>7–9 BTGs</td></tr><tr><td>Bryansk</td><td>Chernihiv offensive direction</td><td>Klimovo, Klintsy, Pochep and Sevsk</td><td>41st CAA and the 90th Guards Tank Division</td><td>3 BTGs</td></tr><tr><td>Kursk–Belgorod</td><td>Sumy offensive direction</td><td>Tomarovka, Vesela Lopan', Zorino, Pristen', Kursk and Belgorod</td><td>6th and 20th CAAs</td><td>4 BTGs</td></tr><tr><td>Voronezh</td><td>Kharkiv offensive direction</td><td>Stary Oskol, Soloti, Valuyki, Boguchar, Pogonovo and Voronezh</td><td>6th Tank and 20th CAAs</td><td>13–14 BTGs</td></tr><tr><td>Smolensk</td><td>operational reserve of the northern front</td><td>Yelnya</td><td>20th and 41st CAAs</td><td>6–7 BTGs</td></tr><tr><td>Rostov</td><td>Donbas and eastern Sea of Azov offensive direction</td><td>Rostov-on-Don and Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy</td><td>8th CAA</td><td>6 BTGs</td></tr><tr><td>Crimea</td><td>southern Ukraine offensive direction</td><td>Crimean Peninsula (Slavne, Dzhankoi, Novoozerne, Yevpatoria, Sevastopol, Oktyabrskoye, Bakhchysarar, Angarskyi, Feodosia, Opuk)</td><td></td><td>up to 13 BTGs</td></tr><tr><td>Kuban</td><td>operational reserve of the southern front</td><td>Kuban Peninsula (Novorossiysk, Korenovsk, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar, Mol'kino and Maykop) and Stavropol</td><td></td><td>6 BTGs</td></tr></tbody></table>

Russian leaders, 2022–23

Despite evolving Russian doctrine, which specified all troops and forces operating from one Operational-Strategic Command (OSK) be placed under one commander, multiple repeated sources (Rochan Consulting, Center for Naval Analysis, British Ministry of Defence) reported that separate groupings of forces drawn from each of the four military districts, under the leadership of senior personnel from that military district, took part in the initial invasion. President Vladimir Putin was repeatedly reported to be very involved, sometimes giving orders to field formations.

According to US officials, the commander of the Russian Southern Military District, Aleksandr Dvornikov, was placed in overall command on 8 April 2022. Analysts of the OSINT organisation CIT speculated that Dvornikov had been replaced by Gennady Zhidko in late May 2022, with US officials quoted in the New York Times also speculating that he had "disappeared". According to Mason Clark of the ISW, since Dvornikov and Zhidko remained "double-hatted" as Military District commanders during their reported terms as overall commanders, they were "first among equals" rather than true theatre commanders.

In October 2022 the Russian ministry of defence officially announced that Sergei Surovikin had been placed in charge of Russia's forces fighting in Ukraine, according to analyst John Hardie writing for the Long War Journal, Surovikin was "likely the operation’s first true unified commander". Surovikin, who Hardie described as "a competent commander" was replaced in January 2023 by Valery Gerasimov. The Russian ministry of defence claimed that Surovikin's replacement was necessitated by the need for a more senior officer to carry out an "amplified range of tasks," and to increase "cooperation between services and branches of the Armed Forces." According to Hardie, Suvorikin's replacement may have reflected "internal power politics".

Russian forces

Russo-Ukrainian war (2022–present) order of battle

Since 12 January 2023, Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov was appointed as commander of military operations in Ukraine, with Surovikin as his deputy.

The actual operational chain of command of the Russian military effort in Ukraine is not public, changes, and is a mix of state and non-state bodies. Personal rivalries are evident. President Vladimir Putin, however, remains firmly in control, sometimes micromanaging. The loose connection of various mercenary bodies and Ramzan Kadyrov's Chechens to the official command chain has been represented by placing them under headers separate to the Russian Armed Forces.

It is unclear how tactical fighter, ground attack, and strategic bomber "sorties" (one flight of one aircraft) are scheduled and controlled.

On 18 April 2023, Russian official sources said that President Putin had held meetings in the Kherson area with several commanders. The President "..received reports from the commander of the Dnepr forces grouping, General Lieutenant Oleg Makarevich, the commander of the Vostok [Eastern] forces grouping, General Lieutenant Andrey Kuzmenko, and the deputy commander of the combined grouping, General Colonel Mikhail Teplinsky." The meetings likely took place before 16 April.

Mercenaries and Foreign Fighters

• Wagner Group (Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Utkin †) • DShRG Rusich (Commander: Alexey Milchakov) • Gazprom Neft Security • Fakel • Plamya • Africa Corps ("Russian Expeditionary Corps") • Patriot • Redut ("1st Expeditionary Volunteer Assault Corps") (GRU)

• Tsar's Wolves • Uran • Korean People's Army (Supreme Leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un) • Korean People's Army Ground Force (Commander: Vice Marshal Ri Yong-gil) • XI Corps • 94th Separate Brigade • Storm Corps (Commander: Colonel General Kim Yong Bok) • 92nd Special Operations Brigade • 94th Special Operations Brigade

Militias

• Storm Ossetia (Commander: Ayvengo Tekhov †) (disbanded in 19 June 2023, restored in an unknown date) • Alania Battalion • Vladlen Tatarsky Battalion

Chechens

• Kadyrovites (Head: Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov) • 141st Special Motorized Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Magomed Tushayev) • North Battalion • Spetsnaz "Akhmat" • 78th Motorized Special Purpose Regiment "North-Akhmat" subordinate to the 42nd Motorised Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army

Spetsnaz units

Clear evidence as to which Grouping of Forces these brigades belong to is not readily available.

• 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Konstantin Bushuev) • 3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade • 10th Spetsnaz Brigade • 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Sergey Polyakov †) (formerly Lieutenant Colonel Albert Karimov †) • 16th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Deputy Commander Major Dmitri Vladimirovich Semenov †) • 24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade • 346th Spetsnaz Brigade of the Russian Special Operations Forces

• 22nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade returned to Russia to reconstitute in 2022 following major losses. The unit was then redeployed to Ukraine, suffering losses around Melitopol in March 2023.