2026 Hungarian parliamentary election
In 2026, Hungary is set to hold parliamentary elections, a pivotal moment that will test the enduring dominance of the ruling Fidesz party. For over a decade, Fidesz has held a commanding two-thirds majority, shaping the nation's political landscape. However, a surprising new challenger has emerged, disrupting the established order and hinting at a potentially dramatic shift in Hungarian politics. The ruling Fidesz party has recently enacted electoral law changes, adjusting constituency borders in a move that critics argue aims to consolidate their power. For the past decade, Fidesz has consistently secured supermajorities in parliament, leaving the opposition fragmented and struggling to gain traction. A major political scandal served as the catalyst for the rapid rise of the TISZA party, a new political force now posing a significant challenge to Fidesz's long-standing dominance.
AI Summary
In 2026, Hungary is set to hold parliamentary elections, a pivotal moment that will test the enduring dominance of the ruling Fidesz party. For over a decade, Fidesz has held a commanding two-thirds majority, shaping the nation's political landscape. However, a surprising new challenger has emerged, disrupting the established order and hinting at a potentially dramatic shift in Hungarian politics.
- The ruling Fidesz party has recently enacted electoral law changes, adjusting constituency borders in a move that critics argue aims to consolidate their power.
- For the past decade, Fidesz has consistently secured supermajorities in parliament, leaving the opposition fragmented and struggling to gain traction.
- A major political scandal served as the catalyst for the rapid rise of the TISZA party, a new political force now posing a significant challenge to Fidesz's long-standing dominance.
Hungary's Next Electoral Showdown
In April 2026, Hungarians will head to the polls for their next parliamentary election. These elections will determine the composition of the National Assembly, the heart of Hungary's legislative power, and could mark a significant turning point for the nation.
Shifting the Electoral Map
Just recently, in December 2024, the National Assembly — largely controlled by the ruling Fidesz-KDNP alliance — approved crucial changes to the country's electoral law. These amendments specifically redrew the boundaries of 106 single-member constituencies, sparking considerable debate and controversy.
Under the new rules, the capital city of Budapest saw its electoral districts shrink from 18 to 16, while Pest County gained an equivalent number. Other border adjustments also took place in Csongrád-Csanád and Fejér counties. Fidesz justified these changes by citing the results of the 2022 census, but the opposition quickly cried foul.
Opponents argue that the real motive behind these boundary shifts is to strategically weaken their strongholds, particularly in urban areas like Budapest, where they previously secured direct mandates. For them, it's less about demographic shifts and more about political maneuvering.
A Decade of Fidesz Dominance
To understand the current political climate, we need to look back at the 2022 parliamentary election. On April 3rd of that year, the Fidesz-KDNP alliance secured a staggering 54.13% of the popular vote — the highest share for any party or alliance since Hungary's return to democracy in 1990. This landslide victory handed them a two-thirds majority in parliament for the fourth consecutive time.
The united opposition, which had banded together in an attempt to unseat Fidesz, suffered a crushing defeat. Following this electoral setback, their alliance quickly dissolved, and its member parties once again sat in separate parliamentary groups, struggling to regain momentum. Only the far-right Our Homeland Movement managed to cross the 5% threshold, securing a few seats.
In the period following the 2022 election, only the Democratic Coalition consistently managed to poll in double digits among the opposition parties. However, even their support remained far behind that of the dominant Fidesz alliance, leaving a significant power imbalance in Hungarian politics.
The Rise of TISZA: A Political Earthquake
Then came February 2024, and a scandal that would shake the foundations of Hungarian politics. It was revealed that President Katalin Novák had granted a controversial pardon in a pedophilia case in April 2023. This explosive revelation led to Novák's immediate resignation, along with that of former justice minister Judit Varga, who had countersigned the pardon.
In the wake of this scandal, Judit Varga's estranged ex-husband, Péter Magyar, emerged onto the scene. He initially published a powerful Facebook post, resigning from all his government-related positions. Magyar declared that he had come to see the government's rhetoric of a 'national, sovereign, bourgeois Hungary' as a mere facade for widespread corruption and illicit wealth transfers to those with political connections.
Despite initially stating he would not enter politics, Magyar's critique resonated deeply with many Hungarians. On March 15th, he held a massive rally in Budapest, drawing tens of thousands of attendees. At this event, he formally announced his intention to form a new political party.
Initial polling from that month indicated significant public interest, with around 15% of voters stating they were 'certain or highly likely' to vote for Magyar if he ran for office. This was an unprecedented level of support for an entirely new political figure.
The true scale of Magyar's impact became clear on April 10th, when he announced his bid for the European Parliament election with the previously little-known 'Respect and Freedom Party' — or TISZA. The results were astounding: TISZA finished in a strong second place, garnering nearly 30% of the vote. This was the highest number and percentage of votes for any non-Fidesz party since 2006, sending shockwaves through the political establishment.
TISZA's sudden ascent caused a 'collapse' among other opposition parties, fundamentally altering the Hungarian political landscape. By the end of 2024, some polls even suggested TISZA had become the most popular political party in Hungary, or at least a formidable contender poised to challenge Fidesz in the upcoming general election.
In response to TISZA's rapid growth, several established opposition parties, like the Everybody's Hungary People's Party and the Momentum Movement, began considering not running in the 2026 election. Their aim: to avoid splitting the anti-Fidesz vote and maximize the chances for a government change.
How Hungary's Parliament is Elected
A Mixed Electoral System
The 199 members of Hungary's National Assembly are elected through a unique mixed-member majoritarian system. This means voters cast two types of votes: one for a specific candidate in their local district and another for a party list at the national level.
Specifically, 106 members are elected in single-member constituencies using the 'first-past-the-post' method — meaning the candidate with the most votes wins. The remaining 93 members are chosen from a single nationwide constituency, primarily through proportional representation, ensuring broader party representation.
Thresholds and Allocation
To win seats from the national party list, a party typically needs to cross an electoral threshold of 5% of the total national vote. For coalitions, this threshold is higher: 10% for an alliance of two parties and 15% for three or more. Once these thresholds are met, seats are allocated using the D'Hondt method, designed to ensure proportional representation.
Minority Representation
Hungary's system also includes special provisions for its diverse ethnic minorities. Since 2014, 13 recognized national minorities — including Armenian, German, Romani, and Ukrainian groups — can register their own specific lists. If such a list reaches a lowered quota, they can secure one of the 93 party list seats.
This lowered quota is remarkably small, requiring approximately 0.27% of the total party list votes. Should a minority list not meet this threshold, they can still send a 'minority spokesman' to the National Assembly, who can participate in debates but does not hold full MP voting rights.
\frac{1}{4 \times 93} = \frac{1}{372} \approx 0.27\%Article
2026 Hungarian parliamentary election
Parliamentary elections are to be held in Hungary on 12 April 2026. This parliamentary election will be the 10th since the resumption of free elections in 1990.
Politico Europe has described them as the EU's most important election of 2026. DW News has also described the election as a referendum over if the country will drift towards authoritarianism and Russia or liberal democracy and the EU.
Background
2022 election
On 3 April 2022, with 54.13% of the popular vote, Fidesz–KDNP received the highest vote share by any party or alliance since 1990. It won two-thirds of the seats for the fourth time. The United for Hungary alliance suffered a massive defeat and was shortly after dissolved; its members sat in separate political groups in the National Assembly. From other minor parties, only Our Homeland Movement reached the threshold for entry; the satirical Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party did not. Following the election, only the Democratic Coalition managed to achieve sustained double-digit poll results alongside Fidesz, but still lagged far behind the ruling parties.
The European Parliament views Hungary as a "hybrid regime of electoral autocracy" since 2022 and considers Hungary according to Article 7.1 of the Treaty on European Union in clear risk of a serious breach of the Treaty on European Union. In January 2024, a majority of MEPs voted for a resolution demanding that the Council of the European Union considers that Hungary be stripped of its EU voting rights under Article 7 of the Treaty.
Rise of Tisza
Magyar and Orbán shaking hands in the European Parliament in 2024
Magyar campaigning at a rally in Siófok in 2025
On 2 February 2024, it was revealed that President Katalin Novák had granted a pardon in April 2023 to a criminal involved in a pedophilia case. The scandal resulted in Novák's resignation, and that of former justice minister Judit Varga, who had countersigned the pardon. Not long after, Varga's ex-husband Péter Magyar posted on Facebook that he would resign from all of his government-related positions, stating that the past few years had made him realize that the idea of a "national, sovereign, bourgeois Hungary" stated as the goal of Viktor Orbán's rule was in fact a "political product" serving to obscure massive corruption and transfers of wealth to those with the right connections.
On 15 March 2024, Magyar, despite initially refusing his participation in politics, held a rally attended by tens of thousands in Budapest at which he announced the formation of a new political party. According to polling conducted that month, around 15% of voters claimed they were "certain or highly likely" to vote for Magyar if he ran for office.
On 10 April 2024, Magyar announced his bid to run in both the European and Budapest Assembly elections with the then unknown Tisza Party (Respect and Freedom Party), which finished in second place with nearly 30% of votes, the highest number and percentage of votes by any non-Fidesz party since 2006, eventuating collapse for other opposition parties with it and a new situation in Hungarian politics. Following the midterm elections, the strengthening of the Tisza Party continued and according to the independent/opposition-aligned polls, by the end of the year it had become the most popular political party in Hungary, or at least a close competitor to Fidesz, thus overturning the continuous dominance of ruling parties that had lasted since the Őszöd speech came to light.
The Tisza party selected 103 of its 106 future candidates for the election in a two-round primary late 2025 (following a call for candidates in 2024). The party put forward 3 nominees in each district (except the district of Magyar and 2 seats) and in the first round all Tisza Sziget members above the age of 16 could vote. Voting took place via a modified Borda count. In the second round, voting was opened also to all resident citizens above 18 who could vote for either of the two advancing candidates. Winners were announced on 28 November 2025.
Collapse of the parliamentary opposition
Prior to the presidential pardon scandal, left-wing Democratic Coalition (DK) was considered as the strongest opposition party; its leading member Klára Dobrev even formed a one-party shadow cabinet in September 2022, which clearly indicated the role of the main challenger against the other opposition parties. Public opinion polls, however, in the two years after the 2022 parliamentary election measured DK's support at a maximum of 15–20%. Except for the Momentum Movement and Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party, the opposition parties – Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Jobbik, Dialogue – The Greens' Party and LMP – Hungary's Green Party – usually did not reach the threshold according to public opinion polls. In contrast, the far-right Our Homeland Movement, which many consider a quasi-ally of Fidesz, has consistently been above the electoral threshold. The two years after the 2022 election were characterized by frozen party relations and political apathy, similar to much of the Orbán era, which consisted of a dominant ruling Fidesz–KDNP and far behind, medium and small opposition parties competing each other for a non-growing bloc of opposition voters. Moreover, the governance by decree introduced due to the permanent "state of emergency" due to the Covid and then the Russo-Ukrainian war has significantly eroded the political significance of parliament.
The appearance and rapid advance of the Tisza party completely rearranged the political party structure. A few days after Péter Magyar announced his intention to found a party on 15 March 2024, the not-yet-formed political formation was polled at 15%. As a result, the Democratic Coalition concluded an electoral alliance with MSZP and Dialogue on 28 March. They agreed that the three parties will run on a unified Social Democrat–Green list, called DK–MSZP–Dialogue Alliance, in the upcoming 2024 European Parliament and local elections. The European Parliament election on 9 June 2024 was a complete disaster for the parliamentary opposition parties; while Tisza came second with almost 30% of the vote and 7 seats, the DK–MSZP–Dialogue Alliance received only 8 percent (2 MEPs). The remaining parties – Momentum Movement, Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party, Jobbik and LMP did not obtain a mandate. The Tisza's performance was characterized by the media as a challenge to the ruling Fidesz of Viktor Orbán. The parliamentary opposition was mostly able to retain its seats in the local elections because the newly organized Tisza did not participate in that election – with the exception of Budapest. Klára Dobrev dissolved her shadow cabinet on the next day. The DK–MSZP–Dialogue Alliance also ceased to exist in October 2024. While Tisza gradually caught up with Fidesz during 2025, and then left it behind in the polls, the parliamentary opposition parties completely eroded.
In May 2025, former party leader András Fekete-Győr urged his party the Momentum Movement not to contest in the upcoming parliamentary election, claiming that it would only result in the dispersion of opposition votes. His proposal resulted in numerous statements and discussions in the political public in the upcoming weeks. In the next month, two opposition parties, the Everybody's Hungary People's Party (founded by former PM-candidate Péter Márki-Zay) and the Momentum Movement (first among the parliamentary opposition parties), decided not to run in the next election in the interest of government change. In January 2026, three opposition parties – Solution Movement, Second Reform Era Party and the parliamentary force LMP – Hungary's Green Party – announced within a week that they will not run in the parliamentary election. The LMP party congress declared that "we do not wish to hinder the change of government, so we are not setting up a list or nominating candidates". On 7 February 2026, another parliamentary force, Dialogue – The Greens' Party, announced their withdrawal from participation after the rapid failure of their new attempt called the Hungarian Humanists' Party. On 20 February, the Hungarian Socialist Party – which once governed Hungary between 1994–1998 and 2002–2010 and is the last party remaining from the era of the regime change, alongside Fidesz – withdrew from the election, saying that an electoral system that amounted to "legalised cheating" could only be overcome by uniting behind "the strongest opposition candidate" regardless of party.
Amendment of the electoral law
On 17 December 2024, the National Assembly voted on changes to the constituencies. As a result, the number of electoral districts in Budapest decreased from 18 to 16, while in Pest County the number of districts increased from 12 to 14. Border changes in some parts of Csongrád-Csanád County and Fejér County also happened. The ruling Fidesz–KDNP made the decision citing changes in the results of latest census (2022), but according to the opposition, the real goal was to weaken their position in those, mainly capital districts, where they were previously elected directly. The changes have been accused of amounting to gerrymandering, with the opposition Tisza Party needing to win by around 3–5 points in the national vote in order to get a majority in the Assembly.
Abolished constituencies
• Budapest 17th constituency • Budapest 18th constituency
New constituencies
• Pest County 13th constituency • Pest County 14th constituency
Electoral system
2026 Hungarian parliamentary election
The 199 members of the National Assembly will be elected by mixed-member majoritarian representation with two methods; 106 elected in single-member constituencies by first-past-the-post voting, while the other 93 elected from a single nationwide constituency, by modified proportional representation. The electoral threshold is set at 5% for single party lists, 10% for joint lists of two parties and 15% for joint lists of three or more parties. Since 2014, each of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Croatian, German, Greek, Polish, Romani, Romanian, Rusyn, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, and Ukrainian ethnic minorities can win one of the 93 party lists seats if they register as a specific list and reach a lowered quota of ${\displaystyle {\frac {1}{4\times 93}}={\frac {1}{372}}\approx 0.27\%}$ of the total of party list votes. Each minority is able to send a minority spokesman – without the rights of an MP – to the National Assembly, if the list does not reach this lowered quota. Fractional votes, calculated as all the votes of individual candidates not elected (but associated with a party list over the threshold), as well as surplus votes cast for successful candidates (margin of victory minus 1 vote), are added to the direct lists votes of the respective parties or alliances. Seats are then allocated using the D'Hondt method.
Contesting parties and candidates
2026 Hungarian parliamentary election
A national list can be submitted by a party that has an individual candidate in 71 constituencies, in at least 14 counties and Budapest.
<table><thead><tr><th>Parties</th><th>Ideology</th><th>Leader</th><th>Individual candidates</th><th>Candidates of national lists</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td>Fidesz–KDNP</td><td>National conservatism Right-wing populism</td><td>Viktor Orbán Zsolt Semjén</td><td>106</td><td>279</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Our Homeland</td><td>National conservatism Right-wing populism Ultranationalism</td><td>László Toroczkai</td><td>106</td><td>240</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Tisza</td><td>Conservatism Pro-Europeanism</td><td>Péter Magyar</td><td>106</td><td>185</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>DK</td><td>Pro-Europeanism Social liberalism</td><td>Klára Dobrev</td><td>101</td><td>108</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>MKKP</td><td>Anti-establishment Political satire</td><td>Gergerly Kovács Zsuzsanna Döme</td><td>78</td><td>63</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Workers' Party–Solidarity</td><td>Anti-capitalism Democratic socialism</td><td>Gyula Thürmer Sándor Székely</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Jobbik</td><td>Conservatism Hungarian nationalism</td><td>Béla Adorján</td><td>47</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Centre Party</td><td>Centrism</td><td>Kornél Mihály Vörös</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>NÉP</td><td>Anti-establishment Vaccine hesitancy</td><td>György Gődény</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>NEEM</td><td>Pseudo-historical nationalism</td><td>Alfréd Pócs</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>LMP</td><td>Green liberalism</td><td>Katalin Szabó-Kellner Péter Ungár</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>MIÉP</td><td>Hungarian irredentism</td><td></td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Irány</td><td>Centrism Liberal democracy</td><td>Dezső Farkas</td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>
Independents
A total of 35 independent candidates will contest the elections:
Individual MPs not standing for re-election
<table><thead><tr><th>Name</th><th>Constituency</th><th>Party</th><th>Reason</th><th>Member since</th><th>Ref.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>András Aradszki</td><td>Érd</td><td></td><td>KDNP</td><td>Retiring</td><td>2010</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>György Czerván</td><td>Nagykáta</td><td></td><td>Fidesz</td><td>Retiring</td><td>1998</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Sándor Farkas</td><td>Szentes</td><td></td><td>Fidesz</td><td>Only on list</td><td>1998</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Lajos Kósa</td><td>Debrecen</td><td></td><td>Fidesz</td><td>Only on list</td><td>1990</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>János Lázár</td><td>Hódmezővásárhely</td><td></td><td>Fidesz</td><td>Only on list</td><td>2002</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Károly Pánczél</td><td>Dabas</td><td></td><td>Fidesz</td><td>Retiring</td><td>1998</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>László Pósán</td><td>Debrecen</td><td></td><td>Fidesz</td><td>Only on list</td><td>1998</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>László Tasó</td><td>Debrecen</td><td></td><td>Fidesz</td><td>Only on list</td><td>2004</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>István Tiba</td><td>Hajdúböszörmény</td><td></td><td>Fidesz</td><td>Only on list</td><td>2008</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>László Vécsey</td><td>Gödöllő</td><td></td><td>Fidesz</td><td>Retiring</td><td>2010</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>
Campaign
2026 Hungarian parliamentary election
The Hungarian government accused the Ukrainian government of interfering in the elections and the main opposition Péter Magyar's Tisza Party of trying to get Hungary involved in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that he hoped that a certain person (presumed to be Orban) would not veto a European Union loan for Ukraine. Otherwise, Zelenskyy said, he would "simply give the address of that person to our Armed Forces — our guys can call him and speak to him in their own language." This comment was condemned by Magyar, the European Commission and President of the European Council António Costa. Viktor Orbán also received an endorsement from Donald Trump and Marco Rubio.
In response, during a 15 March demonstration in memory of the 1848 revolution, Magyar accused Orbán of "treason" and inviting Russian agents to interfere in the election to Fidesz advantage.
During the election, the Druzhba pipeline crisis happened. Hungary and Slovakia accused the Ukrainian authorities of deliberately delaying repairs for political reasons. Zelenskyy has said he would prefer not to repair the Druzhba oil pipeline, stating that "my position, which is shared with European leaders, is that I would not repair the pipeline."
The CPAC Hungary meeting had been connected to the campaign.
On 21 March 2026, The Washington Post reported that Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) proposed staging a false flag assassination attempt on Orbán in an attempt to improve his odds to win the election, according to an SVR internal report that was obtained and authenticated by a European intelligence service. On 26 March, Politico Europe reported that a Russian bot network had made social media posts promoting a narrative that Orbán would face an assassination attempt and presenting Ukraine and Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a threat to Orbán.
On 26 March, the documentary film The Price of the Vote was released in Hungary detailing a six-month investigation by independent filmmakers and reporters, which alleged that Fidesz was engaging in a campaign of mass voter intimidation in poor rural or small-town communities prior to the election that have been Fidesz strongholds since 2010. In the film, it was alleged that local Fidesz mayors in such communities offer cash, work, firewood, transport to polling stations, access to medicine, and synthetic drugs in exchange for "correct" votes. In the film, it was also stated that an opposition candidate had dropped his bid to office after a child protection office in a Fidesz-ran area allegedly threatened to take his children into care.
Opinion polls
Total
The following graph presents the average of all polls.
By affiliation
The following two graphs present only the polls that are government-aligned, or independent/opposition-aligned, respectively.